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Abstract
According to a standard argument, higher income inequality fosters
redistributive activities of the government in favor of the median income
earner. This paper shows that if redistribution is achieved by a public
provision of goods and services rather than by transfers, higher income
inequality may imply a smaller  size of the government in majority voting
equilibrium. In addition to a static voting model, an endogenous growth
model is analyzed to examine the role of saving decisions of heterogeneous
individuals for both the distributional incidence of proportional factor income
taxes and the voting outcome.
JEL Classification: D33, H40, O41.










Standard models linking the income distribution and the size of the government are
based on majority voting. The median voter is, by hypothesis, the individual with the
median income. Moreover, the income distribution is viewed as more unequal, the lower
the median income is relative to the mean income. In these models, the more unequal
income is distributed, the higher is the demand of the median voter for redistributive
activities of the government (e.g. Meltzer and Richard, 1981).
1 This argument has also
been exploited to explain the often observed negative relationship between income
inequality and economic growth.
2 Since redistribution were financed by taxes which
distort the saving decisions, higher inequality would slow down investment-driven
growth through the politico-economic channel (e.g. Bertola, 1993;  Persson and
Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). However, the empirical evidence for these
suggestions is, at best, mixed.
3
This paper examines the link between income inequality and the size of government in a
majority voting equilibrium by considering tax-financed redistribution through publicly
provided goods and services rather than transfer policies.
4 Examples include
recreational facilities, parks, roads, health and cultural services. It should be noted that,
like tax-transfer schemes, this kind of public expenditure usually has a redistributive
impact on the median income earner. This is because tax payments (which are used to
finance publicly provided goods) rise with income, but the median income earner does
                                                          
1 Meltzer and Richard (1981) derive this result in a static majority voting model with a (distortive) linear
tax-transfer scheme. That is, the poorer the median income earner (i.e. the median voter) is relatively to
the mean income earner, the higher is his/her net transfer. However, Roemer (1998) has shown that when
voting problems are multi-dimensional, i.e. there is voting not only over redistribution but also over a non-
economic issue (like religion), it may well be that poor individuals vote for conservative tax policies.
2 Using a new data set about inequality measures,  Deininger and Squire (1996) cast doubts on the
existence of such a relationship. See, for instance, Grossmann (2001) for a review of the theoretical and
empirical literature on the relationship between inequality and growth.
3 Whereas Meltzer and Richards (1983) provide some time-series evidence for the U.S. in favor of their
theory, Lybeck (1986) rejects the hypothesis for Sweden. In cross-country studies, Mueller and Murrell
(1986) find some weak support, but  Kristov,  Lindert and McClelland (1992) even find that a lower
median to mean income ratio  decreases redistribution. According to Rodriguez (1998), not a single
redistribution measure is positively affected by inequality of gross income. Also Perotti (1996) does not
find any link between inequality and tax rates or transfers, respectively. Moreover, his estimates suggest
that  redistributive measures positively affect growth (see also  Basett, Burkett and  Putterman, 1999).
However, in a recent cross-country study of 24 democracies, Milanovic (2000) finds evidence for the
hypothesis that higher income inequality leads to more redistribution.
4 Opposed to the long debate about whether or not higher  per capita income yields a larger public
consumption share, a hypothesis known as Wagner’s law, here it is considered how the income dispersion
affects the size of the public sector.3
not necessarily consume less of publicly provided goods and services than richer
individuals. As Boadway and Wildasin (1986, p. 506) state:
“Almost any taxing or expenditure decision of local governments will have
distributive implications; it cannot be avoided.”
More specifically, it is analyzed if public consumption spending as share of national
income rises or falls with income inequality. This is done in both a simple static model
and a dynamic general equilibrium model with investment-driven growth. The
intertemporal model allows to analyze the role of the tax effects on savings for the
voting outcome, when individuals differ in capital endowments. In fact, this is the main
focus of this paper.
As it turns out, one cannot generally expect a positive relationship between income
inequality and the public consumption share in a majority voting equilibrium. For
instance, assuming exogenous labor supply and specifying the tax scheme as synthetic
income tax (various tax schemes are considered), higher inequality of capital
endowments unambiguously leads to lower taxation and public expenditure,
respectively. The reason for this is the following. As usual in models with infinite
planning horizons and perfect credit markets, higher capital income taxation induces
owners of capital to reduce savings, leaving the impact on their consumption levels
ambiguous. In turn, lower savings slow down investment-driven growth, negatively
affecting growth rates of both income and consumption of all individuals similarly (as
usual in steady state equilibrium). In contrast, higher  labor income taxation
unambiguously reduces consumption  levels of owners of labor but does not affect
savings and growth. Thus, an increase in the public consumption share hurts capital-
poor individuals more than capital-rich ones under a synthetic income tax.
Finally, it is shown that allowing for endogenous labor supply may lead to an additional
shift of the relative tax burden towards capital-poor individuals. Analogously to the just
described “savings effect”, this is the case when capital-rich individuals can also better
cope with labor income taxation by adjusting leisure upward.
Fig. 1 shows that in a cross-section of OECD countries, the Gini coefficient of gross
income (as measure of inequality) and public consumption expenditure as share of GDP
are indeed negatively, rather than positively related. Also Clarke (1995) finds, if
anything, a negative (although not very robust) relationship between inequality and the
public consumption share, using a broader set of countries. Moreover, many studies4
suggest a weak empirical link between income inequality indicators and various tax
rates (e.g. Perotti, 1996; Figini, 1999).
Figure 1: Inequality and the share of public consumption in the OECD.
Data sources: Gini coefficients from Deininger and Squire (1996) and World Bank (1998);
public consumption shares from OECD (1999).
Notes: The latest available Gini coefficient from the above sources is included. Moreover, the
average public consumption share from 1994-96 is used.
In an alternative class of models, Bénabou (1996, 2000) and Saint-Paul (2001) show
that capital market imperfections (e.g. borrowing constraints to finance higher
education) lead to majority voting equilibria where redistribution and inequality may
indeed be negatively related. It should be noted that the majority voting approach in this
paper is not chosen because it is the best way to represent actual political processes, but
in order to show that standard results about the relationship between inequality and the
size of the government can be overturned. Analyzing a representative democracy model
rather than a median voter model,  Peltzman (1980) already derives the result that
Gini coefficient








































































redistribution can rise when income is distributed more equally. Moreover, whether or
not one believes that actual political outcomes can be understood by median voter
models, it is interesting to examine the determinants of individually preferred policies
(without necessarily drawing conclusions for voting equilibria).
The results of this paper may also be compared with the literature on the relationship
between inequality and the private provision of public goods. As pointed out by Sandler
(1997), it crucially depends on the “technology of public good aggregation” whether this
relationship is positive or negative.
5 Related work also includes the median-voter
growth model of Fiaschi (1999), in which government spending is productive (Alesina
and  Rodrik, 1994). That is, in his model public investments enter the production
function of a representative firm, whereas in my model the level of public consumption
enters the utility functions of agents. Moreover, Fiaschi (1999) argues that the level of
taxation need not be negatively related to growth, whereas I show that inequality need
not be positively related to government spending.
Section 2 sets up a simple static median voter model and examines the link between the
income distribution and the public consumption share. Section 3 proposes a growth
model which is in some sense  comparable with the static model of section 2. The
equilibrium growth rate is derived in section 4. Section 5 identifies the additional effects
on the individual demand for public consumption compared with the static case. Section
6 derives the voting equilibrium. In section 7, both the assumptions and the contribution
of the model are discussed; moreover, the analysis is extended by allowing for
endogenous labor supply. The last section concludes.
2. Voting over public expenditure: A simple model
In this section, a static model with majority voting over the level of public consumption
expenditure is presented.
                                                          
5 For instance, if the total provision of public goods hinges on the (richest) individual which contributes
most (“best-shot technology”), higher inequality raises public good provision. However, the opposite
holds if the total provision depends on the least endowed contributor (“weakest-link technology”). If the
total provision depends on the sum of contributions and all individuals contribute positive amounts, then
the income distribution does not affect total public good provision at all. However, this “neutrality result”
does not hold in the presence of non-contributors. (For implications, see e.g. Itaya, De Meza and Myles,
1997; Cornes and Sandler, 2000.)6
There are  i ˛[0, ] 1  individuals with an exogenous income  yi > 0. Thus, total income
￿ =
1
0 di y Y
i  equals per capita income. Following the politico-economic literature about
income inequality and redistribution (e.g.  Meltzer and Richard, 1981), an income
distribution is called more equal, the higher the median income is relative to the mean.
6
Denote  ci the individual consumption level of a private numeraire bundle and G the
level of a publicly provided good.
7 (In the following, these are referred to a private and a
public consumption good, respectively.)
8 Individuals have identical preferences
represented by a twice differentiable utility function  u c G i ( , ) which is strictly
increasing in its arguments and strictly quasi-concave. Assume that one unit of the
private consumption good can be transformed in one unit of the public consumption
good. The public consumption good is financed by income taxes. Let s s y i i = ( ) denote
the tax share (or contribution share, respectively) of individual  i to total public
consumption expenditure.  s( ) ￿  is a non-decreasing function, which is taken as given by
individuals. Furthermore, denote the average tax rate as a function t( ) ￿  of income, i.e.
t( ) [ , ] yi ˛ 0 1  is the average income tax rate of individual i. Thus, a balanced budget
requires  ￿ =
1
0 ) ( di y y G
i i t , and, according to the definition of the tax share, we have





= = ( )
( ) t
.
                                                          
6 It is frequently found that personal income in an economy is approximately log-normally distributed.
With a log-normal income distribution, one can show that the Gini coefficient increases if and only if the
median to mean income ratio decreases ( Aitchison and Brown, 1966). This result thus gives some
justification to consider the income distribution as less equal, the lower the median income is relative to
the mean income.
7 The publicly provided good can either be viewed as pure public good or as private good which is
consumed in equal amounts by the individuals. The reason for this is the following. If the publicly
provided good is private and G G
i =  for all i, where G
i  denotes the individual consumption level of that
good, then G G di
i = ￿0
1
 with a unit mass of individuals.
8 See Epple and Romano (1996) for a different median voter model with a private numeraire bundle and a
publicly provided private good. Whereas their paper analyzes the role of private supplements of the
publicly provided good, my focus is the link between the income distribution and the public sector.7
(Note that  1
1
0 = ￿ di s
i .) That is, for a given income  yi , the average tax rate of individual
i endogenously adjusts to the level of public consumption G, which is the single variable
individuals vote on. That is, t( ) ( ) / y s y G y i i i = , according to (1).
Each individual i solves the following problem:




u c G   s.t.  c s G y i i i + £ .
Assuming an interior solution, the individual demand for G, denoted 
i G , is given by
(3) ) (
) , ) ( (
) , ) ( (
1
2 i
i i i i
i i i i
y s
G G y s y u





(3) simply states that the marginal rate of substitution between the two goods equals the
individual tax share (i.e. the individual price of the public consumption good in units of
the private consumption good).
9 This condition implicitly defines the individual demand
Gi for public consumption as function of individual income  yi.
Now consider homothetic preferences, i.e. without loss of generality, assume that the
utility function u is linear homogenous.






































                                                          
9 See e.g. Borcherding and Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973).
10 In our context, homothetic preferences can be justified as follows. Assuming both a constant price and
income elasticity, denoted d and k, respectively, we have  G h s y h
i i i = > ( ) ( ) ,
d k 0 (e.g. Bergstrom and
Goodman, 1973). Under the assumption that the decisive voter is the one with median income, i.e. the
public consumption good is non-inferior, this expression yields a typical estimated equation in the public
choice literature on public consumption, given by  h k d + + + =
m m y s h G ln ln ln ln , where  s
m  and  y
m  is
the median tax share and median income of the economy, respectively (h is an error term). Typically, k,
the elasticity of public consumption with respect to the median income holding the tax share constant, is
estimated around unity. (For survey articles about the empirical estimates, see Mueller, 1989, ch. 17;
Holsey and Borcherding, 1997). This empirical result is consistent with homothetic preferences.8
where  MRS u u ( ) ( , ) / ( , ) ￿ ” ￿ ￿ 2 1 1 1  denotes the marginal rate of substitution. The
following lemma shows how Gi depend on the individual income  yi.
Lemma 1: With homothetic preferences, the total elasticity of public consumption

























 is the elasticity of substitution evaluated at
Gi and  i i i i s y y s / ) ( ¢ ” c  is the income elasticity of the individual tax share.
Proof: See appendix A. ￿
The first term of the right-hand-side of (5) is the income elasticity of individual public
consumption demand if the individual price of public consumption si is held constant.
11
(As it is well known, this elasticity equals unity with homothetic preferences.)
According to the second term of (5), if the individual tax share function is increasing in
income (i.e. if  ci > 0), the sign of the total income elasticity of public consumption
demand is ambiguous. This is because richer individuals have to pay a higher ‘price’ for
the publicly provided good. Nevertheless, rich individuals may prefer a large public
sector.
Let individuals vote over the level of publicly consumption G. Since policy preferences
over the level of public consumption are single-peaked (due to the strict quasi-concavity
of the utility function), the median voter theorem can be applied. The voting outcome is
assumed to be a one-man, one-vote decision. If there would be a monotonic relationship
                                                          
11 If, e.g., the public consumption good would be financed by a uniform poll tax, this would be the only
effect. Thus, in this case demand for public consumption would be a positive function of individual
income (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, ch. 10).9
between 
i G  and  yi, the decisive median voter would be the median income earner.
12
Thus, one can conclude the following.
Proposition 1 (Static model): If the median income earner is the decisive voter, then
higher income inequality (i.e. a lower median income for a given mean income) does not
necessarily lead to a larger size of public consumption in majority voting equilibrium.
Proof: Directly follows from lemma 1. ￿
Since public expenditure has a redistributive impact if the tax share is an increasing
function of income, proposition 1 questions the standard argument that tax rates (and
redistribution) are higher in more unequal economies.
Example (Proportional income tax): In the remainder of the paper, proportional income
taxes are considered. In the static model above, this means that the tax share function
) (￿ s  is such that  t t
i =  holds for all  i. Thus,  s y Y i i = /  according to (1), i.e. the
individual tax share equals relative income. This implies  ci =1, i.e. the income
elasticity of the individual tax share equals unity. Moreover, we have  G Y = t , i.e.  t
equals the public consumption share of total income. Hence, voting over the level of
public consumption is equivalent to voting over the public consumption share. Using













where qi i y Y = /  denotes relative income and t
i i G Y = /  denotes the preferred public
consumption share of individual i.
13
                                                          
12 Note that lemma 1 implies that even with  homothetic preferences the relationship between public
consumption demand and individual income is not necessarily monotone such that the median income
earner is generally not identical with the median voter. In this case, the voting equilibrium depends on the
entire income distribution (e.g. Bergstrom and Goodman, 1973).
13 Thus, for a given relative income of the median voter, the public consumption share in the politico-
economic equilibrium does not depend on per capita income (i.e. Wagner’s law does not hold).10
Proposition 2 (Static model with a proportional income tax): Suppose homothetic
preferences and a proportional income tax. If the median income earner m is the decisive
voter and  em < = > ( , )1, then the elasticity of the public consumption share  t
m in
majority voting equilibrium with respect to relative median income q
m is positive (zero,
negative).
Proof: Using qi i y Y = /  and t































e = - 1  according to (5). ￿
The total effect of a higher (relative) income on the desired level of public consumption
can be divided into two effects: first, a substitution effect arising from an increase in the
relative ‘price’ of the public consumption good faced by an individual (since the
individual tax share rises with income), and second, a wealth effect (or income effect,
respectively) due to the rising consumption possibilities (for a given tax share). Since
the publicly provided good is normal, both effect go in opposite directions. If the
individually preferred ratio of private and public consumption is sufficiently elastic
(inelastic) to the individual tax share, i.e. if  e
i >1 (e
i <1), the substitution effect
dominates (is weaker than) the wealth effect. With Cobb-Douglas preferences (i.e.
e
i =1) both effects exactly cancel.
In the next section, the additional role of saving decisions of heterogeneous agents in a
dynamic general equilibrium growth model in which public consumption is financed by
proportional taxes on both accumulated and nonaccumulated factor income is examined.
3. Public expenditure in a growth model
3.1 The aggregate economy
There is a private consumption good  Y produced by identical firms and a publicly
provided good G which is financed by proportional factor income taxes. Output Y is11
produced with an accumulated factor  K and a non-accumulated factor  L.  K can be
viewed as a composite of human and physical capital (e.g.  Rebelo, 1991), called
“capital” hereafter, whereas L can be viewed as land or unskilled labor, called “labor”
hereafter. The economy’s total labor supply is normalized to unity (i.e.  L =1). The
firms’ technology at time t is represented by the following production function:
(7) Y t aA t K t L ( ) ( ) ( ) = - 1 a a , a > 0, 0 1 < < a ,
where a is a productivity parameter. There is an external productivity of  A t K t A ( ) ( ) = a ,
commonly interpreted to be generated by learning-by-doing or human capital spill-over
effects. The aggregate capital stock  KA is taken as given by the firms.
14 Let the
identical firms be of mass unity such that  K K A =  holds in equilibrium. The resulting
social production function is thus given by Y t aK t ( ) ( ) = .
In order to finance the public consumption good the government imposes taxes on
capital and labor income with tax rates  max
K K t t £  and  1 £ L t , respectively. (See below
for the definition of  max
K t .) Then at time t after-tax returns r t ( ) and w t ( ) on  K  and  L,
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according to (7). The government budget is assumed to be balanced in any point of time.
As in the static model of section 2, let the marginal rate of transformation between the
                                                          
14 Despite increasing social returns to scale, this specification allows one to maintain the assumption of
perfect competition in the goods market since the technology exhibits constant returns to scale for a given
level of A. Non-decreasing (social) marginal productivity of capital as source of endogenous growth has
been proposed by  Romer (1986). The particular specification here is chosen for its familiarity and
simplicity.12
private and public consumption be constant and normalized to unity. Thus, the quantity
of the publicly provided good equals the tax revenue. Using (8) and (9), we have




K L = = - + t a t a ( ) 1 .
Thus, public consumption expenditure as share of total output, g, is a weighted average
of the tax rates. Specify the tax scheme as
(12) L K t u t = ,
which is discussed in the following.
15 First, (12) ensures that the voting problem, which
is considered below, is one-dimensional. Second, if  ¥ < <u 0 , both owners of capital
and owners of labor contribute to finance public consumption. Interpreting the
accumulated factor as ‘human capital’ and the non-accumulated factor as ‘raw labor’
(see Romer, 1990, p. S79, for a discussion of this interpretation), the government may
be incapable to distinguish (and tax differently) the components of individual earnings
that correspond to the return to either factor. Thus,  1 = u , i.e. a synthetic income tax, is
an important special case in the analysis below. Third, if  0 = u  or  ¥ ﬁ u , public
consumption is financed solely by labor taxation (i.e.  0 = K t ) or capital taxation (i.e.
0 = L t ), respectively. Fourth, consider the case  0 < u . In fact,  ) 1 /( a a u - - =  amounts
to the special case of Bertola (1993), who deals with factor income redistribution rather
than with tax-financed public consumption. To see that  0 = g  holds in this case, use
(11) and (12) to find the following proportional relationship between the public
consumption share  g  and the tax rate on labor income  L t :
(13) L g t F = , where F ” - + ( ) 1 a u a .
                                                          
15 Most of the following discussion I owe an anonymous referee.13
Thus, for  0 > g  and  0 > L t  to be possible, one needs to impose the restriction  0 > F ,
i.e.  ) 1 /( a a u - - > . Analogously, if  0 > K t  and  0 < u  is considered,  0 > g  requires
0 < F , i.e.  ) 1 /( a a u - - < . However, note that in these cases (i.e.  0 < u ) any increase
in  g  simultaneously implies a redistribution of factor incomes. As this may be viewed
as undesirable, I will mostly focus on  0 ‡ u .
16 (See also the discussion of an alternative
tax scheme in section 7.)
Without depreciation, capital grows over time according to
(14) &( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) K t aK t C t G t = - - ,
where C(t) denotes the aggregate level of private consumption at time t. Thus, if there is
a balanced growth rate J  (which will be derived below), we obtain
(15) J = = = = = $( ) $( ) $( ) $( ) $( ) K t Y t C t w t G t ,
where the hat over a variable denotes its growth rate. Moreover, according to (10), (14)
and (15), the initial level of aggregate private consumption is given by
(16) ( ) 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( K g a C J - - = ,
where K K ( ) 0 0 0 = >  denotes the aggregate initial capital stock of the economy.
3.2 Individual budget constraints and preferences
There is a unit-mass continuum of infinitely living consumers indexed  i ˛[0, ] 1 , who
privately own the production factors. Hence, aggregates are equal to per capita values.
Individuals differ in capital endowments  k k i i ( ) 0 0 0 ” >  (i.e. the individual skill or
wealth levels) and labor endowments  li > 0. Denoting the individual consumption of
                                                          
16 According to (12), if  0 < u , then one factor is actually subsidized, as in Bertola (1993). However, this
is not crucial. For instance, assuming  L K t u c t + =  instead of (12) would not change any of the results
but allows both tax rates to be positive (if  0 > c ) although the relationship between  K t  and  L t  may be
negative (i.e.  0 < u ).14
the private consumption level at time t by  c t i( ), the individual budget constraints are
given by
(17) & ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) k t rk t w t l c t i i i i £ + -   and   lim
tﬁ￿
- ‡ e k t
rt i( ) 0,
where the latter is the usual ‘No  Ponzi Game’ condition. Each individual has the
following time-separable utility function





( ( ), ( )) ,
where r denotes the subjective time preference parameter. For technical reasons, assume















Note that (19) is a monotonic and positive transformation of a Cobb-Douglas (and thus
of a homogenous) utility function. (Hence, as common in the endogenous growth
literature, preferences are homothetic.) The parameter  g > 0 indicates the individual
preference for public consumption, and s > 0 is the elasticity of marginal instantaneous
utility with respect to private consumption. As it will turn out, the assumption









max, according to (8). (Ensuring non-negative growth rates is
necessary if investments are assumed to be irreversible.) Note that  ) 1 , 0 ( max ˛ K t , since
a ) 1 ( 0 a r - < <  has been assumed. Two properties of (19) are notable. First, the
marginal instantaneous utility with respect to private consumption increases (does not
change, decreases) with the level of public consumption G, if s <1 (s = 1, s >1). And
second, (19) implies that the elasticity of substitution between the two goods is equal to15
one, i.e. e
i =1 for all i. Remember that in the static model of section 2 (in the case of
homothetic preferences and proportional income taxation), the public consumption
share in voting equilibrium does not depend on the income distribution if e
i =1 for all
i, according to proposition 2.
4. Equilibrium growth and public consumption
In this section the equilibrium growth rate  J  for given tax rates is derived. Each
individual maximizes utility (18) and (19) subject to the budget constraints (17),
perfectly foreseeing and taking as given the path of public consumption, determined by
(10) and (11).
Lemma 2: Each individual i chooses the private consumption level to grow according to
(20) $ ( ) $( )
( )( ) ( ) $( )
c t C t
a G t i K = =
- - - + - 1 1 1 t a r g s
s
.
Proof: See appendix A. ￿
Thus, using (8), (12) and (15), the balanced growth rate is given by
(21) J




- - - r a L
W W
( )( ) 1 1
(remember  0 ) 1 ( > - + = W g g s ). First, note that due to the simple technology in (7),
there are no transitional dynamics to the steady state growth path. Second, (21) shows
that capital taxation discourages growth since it reduces the private return on investment
and thus lowers the amount of savings in this infinite-horizon framework (e.g. Rebelo,
1991). Moreover, the growth rate  J  does not depend on the taxation of the non-
accumulated factor. The reason for this is the following. According to (20), all agents
desire the same private consumption growth rate which is equal to the growth rate of16
labor income  J  in steady state, according to (9), (15) and (21). Since agents are
infinitely living, this also implies that each individual accumulates capital at the same
rate J , according to (17). Thus, at each instant, the aggregate amount of savings does
not depend on labor income.
17 Third, one finds that a higher public consumption
preference parameter g  raises (does not affect, lowers) J  if s <1 (s =1, s >1). This
result can be understood as follows. For instance, if s <1, the marginal instantaneous
utility of private consumption, which equals the current-value shadow-price of
individual labor income in any point of time (see the proof of lemma 2 in appendix),
increases with current public consumption. According to (20), if  s <1, it is thus
optimal for an individual to choose a higher growth rate of private consumption, the
stronger the preference for public consumption. (The intuition for the cases s =1 and
s >1 is completely analogous.)
5. Individual demand for public consumption and growth
In this section, it is considered how the individual demand for the public consumption
share  g  depends on factor incomes (or endowments, respectively). Using (8), (9), (17)
and presuming r > J  to obtain bounded life time consumption (see e.g. Bertola, 1993),






i l K a k a c 0 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 0 ( a t J a t - + - - - = . Substituting (21) we have
                                                          
17 In contrast, relaxing the infinite horizon assumption, the analysis of overlapping generations models by
Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) as well as Bertola (1996) shows that, holding the tax revenue share of
national income constant, lower taxation of the non-accumulated factor at cost of higher capital income
taxation may even yield faster investment-driven growth. This is because the tax burden of young agents
(i.e. individuals with little capital accumulated yet) is relieved, leaving them with more income out of
which to save. For instance, in an OLG model with two-period lifetimes and no bequests, only the young
but not the old agents save. However, with infinite lifetimes, agents are always ‘young’ and thus keep
saving forever.
18 Note that  r - > J 0 implies  lim
tﬁ￿
- = e k t
rt i( ) 0 ( transversality condition). Since the first budget
constraint in (17) holds with equality, it can be written as
= +
- ¥ - ¥
￿ ￿ dt e t k dt e t c
t r i t r i
0 0 ) ( ) ( & dt e l t w dt e t k r
t r i t r i - ¥ - ¥
￿ ￿ +
0 0 ) ( ) ( . Using the transversality condition, it
is easy to show that 
i t r i t r i k dt e t k r dt e t k 0 0 0 ) ( ) ( - =
- ¥ - ¥
￿ ￿
& . Finally, substitute the latter expression, (8), (9)
and the balanced growth paths 
t i i e c t c
J ) 0 ( ) ( =  and 
t e K t K
J ) 0 ( ) ( =  to obtain the expression for c
i( ) 0 .17

















i i l K a k c 0 0 ) 1 ( ) 0 ( a t r - + = .
The first right-hand-side term of (22) and (23), respectively, is initial capital income
minus savings and the second term is initial labor income (net of taxes). Thus, if  1 < L t ,
the optimal private consumption expenditure exceeds labor income (remember  ki
0 0 > ).
This can be understood by the fact that the capital growth rate is identical among
individuals which implies that capital income minus savings does not depend on the
labor endowment. If  s =1, capital income minus savings does not depend on the
private return of investment as well. Thus, in this case only the labor tax rate  L t  matters









(Remember that total labor supply is normalized to unity.) Using this definition, one
finds that the individual savings rate
(25)










is increasing in  xi if  1 < L t .
19 Again, this is an implication of the fact that capital
accumulation rates are identical for all individuals.
In order to derive the individually preferred public consumption shares, one has to
observe the restrictions on  g  implied by the restrictions on the tax rates. According to
                                                          
19 The individual savings rate is given by  ) ( / ) ( t y t k sav
i i i & =  with  y t rk t w t l
i i i ( ) ( ) ( ) = + . Using (9) and
the fact that  & ( ) ( ) k t k t
i i = J  yields (25).18
(13), if  0 > F  (remember that  0 > L t  in this case must hold for  0 > g  to be feasible),
then  1 £ L t  implies  F £ g ; moreover, if  0 ‡ K t  (remember that  0 < F  must hold if
0 < u  and  0 > K t  for  0 > g  to be feasible)  max
K K t t £  implies  u t / max
K g F £ .
5.1 The case s =1
First, in order to derive the mechanisms for a simple case (but for all feasible factor tax
ratios  u ),  s =1 is considered. Denote indirect life-time utility of agent i by 
i V . If
s =1, substituting the optimal path of individual private consumption and the path of





i i = + +
+





(Note that instantaneous utility (19) becomes  G c G c u i i ln ln ) , ( g + =  as s  approaches
unity.) Substituting (10), (21) and (23) into this expression and using (12), (13) and (24)
yields
(27) ( ) ( )
L +
- - F - +
+ + F - + =
r
r a u g
g a x r r
a g
g a g V i i ) 1 ( ) / 1 ( ) 1 (
ln ) / 1 ( ln ,
where  L ” ln( ) aK li
0
2  is an unessential constant. Denote the preferred public
consumption share of individual  i  by  gi, where  g V
i
g
i = argmax   s.t.  g ‡ 0,
u t / max
K g F £ , and, if  0 > F ,  g £ F. It can be shown that  V i is a strictly concave
function of  g . (This ensures that the median voter theorem can be applied.)
Furthermore, define  ~ argmax g V
i
g
i ” . (Note that  g g i i = ~  if the restrictions on  g  are
not binding.)19
Lemma 3: For s =1 and  i i g g ~ = . The individually preferred public consumption share
gi is an increasing function of the relative factor endowment xi if  ¥ < < - - u a a ) 1 /(
and  0 ‡ L t ;  gi is a decreasing function of xi if  ) 1 /( a a u - - <  and  0 ‡ K t ;  gi does
not depend on xi if  ¥ ﬁ u  (i.e.  0 = L t ).
Proof: See appendix A. ￿
Lemma 3 can be understood by inspection of the first three terms of (27). The first and
the second term reflect the impact of g on utility from the initial private and public
consumption level, respectively, whereas the third term reflects the impact of growth on
utility. Neither the second nor the third term of (27) depends on individual endowments.
This is because all individuals choose the same growth rate of private consumption (see
(20)). In other words, since individual income from capital and labor are growing at the
same rate, the impact of capital income taxation on  growth affects all individuals
equally. In contrast, the optimal choice of the initial private consumption level  ) 0 ( i c
depends on the individual factor endowments 
i k0 and 
i l , respectively. Thus, according
to (27), it suffices to examine how the impact of a (marginal) increase in the public
consumption share  g  on  ) 0 ( ln i c  varies with factor endowments 
i k0 and 
i l ,
respectively. In other words, the question is how the elasticity of  ) 0 ( i c  with respect to
g , given the tax scheme, depends on the relative factor endowments xi. This elasticity
determines the distributional incidence of taxation.
Note that  ) 0 ( ) 0 ( ) 0 ( i i i k y c & - = , where 
i i i l w k r y ) 0 ( ) 0 ( 0 + =  is disposable income and
i i k k 0 ) 0 ( J = &  are initial savings. Also note that r  and J  are decreasing in  K t , according
to (8) and (21), respectively, and  ) 0 ( w  is decreasing in  L t , according to (9). Keeping
these facts in mind, in the following, the intuition of lemma 3 is discussed for various
factor tax ratios u  (and for feasible signs of  K t  and  L t  implied, respectively).
•  ¥ < <u 0 : In this case,  0 > g  implies both  0 > L t  and  0 > K t . With respect to the
individually preferred public consumption share, three effects of individual
endowments can be distinguished. On the one hand, as in the static model of section20
2, there is a substitution effect and a wealth effect of 
i k0 and 
i l  on the individually
preferred  g , working through the impacts of 
i k0 and 
i l  on disposable income
) 0 ( i y . Whereas the wealth effect is standard (see section 2), the substitution effect
reflects the fact that, if g increases, losses of disposable factor incomes are more
pronounced if factor endowments are higher (i.e., all other things equal, the relative
‘price’ of public consumption, faced by an individual, is higher; again, see section
2). On the other hand, compared with the static model, there now is an additional
savings effect of a higher individual capital endowment 
i k0. If  0 > u , this effect
works in the same direction as the wealth effect. To see this, note that if  0 > K t , the
savings reduction of an individual after an increase in  g  (i.e. an increase in  K t ) is
higher, the higher the capital endowment 
i k0. (To see this formally, note that
0 / ) 0 ( 0
2 < ¶ ¶ ¶
i
K
i k k t & .) In other words, due to the impact of an increase in g on
initial individual savings  ) 0 ( i k & , the impact of an increase in g on the (initial) private
consumption level  ) 0 ( i c  is less pronounced for a capital-rich individual compared
to a capital-poor one, for any  ) , 0 ( ¥ ˛ u .
•  0 = u : As  0 = K t  in this case (i.e. labor bears the entire tax burden), the preferred
public consumption share is higher, the more an individual can rely on capital
income.
•  ¥ ﬁ u : As  0 = L t  in this case, with  s =1, the private consumption level is not
affected by an increase in  g , according to (23). As a result, all individuals vote for
the same public consumption share. (It is easy to show that  ( )
1 ) 1 ( ~ - + = g r a gi  if
tL = 0.) Thus, for s =1 and tL = 0, one obtains a similar result as in proposition
2. (Remember that e
i =1 for all i, according to (19).)
•  0 < u : Note that in this case,  0 > F  if  0 > L t  and  0 < F  if  0 > K t  has to be
imposed for  0 > g  to be feasible (see above). If  0 > L t  and capital is subsidized, a
similar result as in the case  0 = = K t u  holds, since  ) 0 ( i c  is not affected by  K t  (if
s =1). If  0 > K t  and labor is subsidized, then the more an individual relies on21
labor income, the higher is his/her preferred public consumption share. Thus, only in
the latter case capital-poorer agents vote for higher public spending.
5.2 The case s „ 1 and  ¥ < £u 0
In order to focus the analysis, from now on  ¥ < £u 0  is presumed. That is, an increase
in the public consumption share  g  does not simultaneously redistribute factor income
(i.e.  0 < u  is excluded) and  0 > L t  whenever  0 > g  (i.e.  ¥ ﬁ u  is excluded).
According to (22), if  s „ 1, the initial private consumption level is also affected by
capital income taxation which potentially alters the result. According to (18) and (19),
life-time utility 
i V  is now given by
20
(28)  ( )
( )

















It is easy to check that maximization of 
i V  with respect to  g is equivalent to
maximization of
(29) ( ) ( ) ln ( ) /
ln ( ) ln ( )



















Like in the case s =1, it suffices to examine how the partial derivative  ¶ ¶ ln ( ) / c g i 0
depends on xi, which determines the distributional incidence of taxation (given the tax
scheme). This is because, similar to the case  s =1, the relationship between public
consumption and growth (which is a trade-off if  0 > K t ) is not individual-specific.
                                                          
20 Note that according to (21),  r >J  (assumed above) is equivalent to  r s g > - + ( )( ) 1 1 r , thus implying
that  r s g J - - + > ( )( ) 1 1 0 .22
Lemma 4 : For  i i g g ~ =  and  ¥ < £u 0 . (i) The preferred public consumption share  gi
increases with (does not depend on, decreases with) the relative factor endowment xi if
s >1 and u r < = > + ( , ) / 1 G . (ii)  i g  unambiguously increases with xi if s <1.
Proof: See appendix A. ￿
First, consider the case  s >1, i.e. the intertemporal elasticity of substitution with
respect to private consumption is lower than unity. In other words, individuals are fairly
impatient and therefore choose low savings. This also implies that the savings effect,
described above, is smaller than in the case of s =1 (all other things equal). Thus, the
impact of an increase in the capital income tax rate  K t  on the private consumption level
) 0 ( i c  is negative (see (22)). As a result, if the factor tax ratio  L K t t u / =  is sufficiently
high, owners of capital prefer a rather low public consumption share. Note, however,
that in the case of a synthetic income tax (i.e. u =1) the preferred public consumption
share  i g  of individual i still increases with his/her relative factor endowment  i x .
Second, if  s <1, the private consumption level increases with the capital income tax
rate. This is because s <1 means that individuals are fairly patient and thus the savings
effect is large. As a result, the positive impact of a higher (relative) capital endowment
on the preferred public consumption share is even strengthened compared to the case
s =1.
21
6. Voting equilibrium in the growth model
In majority voting equilibrium the preferred spending fraction  m g  of the individual with
the median relative factor endowment x m is realized. This directly follows from the fact
                                                          
21 Note that in case of  s < 1 and  0 > u , there may not even be a trade-off between private and public
consumption (i.e. if u  or x
i  are sufficiently large). In this case, individuals face a trade-off between the
consumption levels of both goods on the one hand and subsequent growth on the other hand. In contrast,
for s ‡ 1 and  0 > u , there is always a trade-off between the public consumption level on the one hand
and the private consumption level and growth on the other hand.23
that the individually preferred public consumption share  i g  is monotonic in the relative
factor endowment  i x . Whereas x x
i m = =1 for all i in a perfectly egalitarian economy,
the real-world distribution of relative factor endowments is skewed such that x
m <1, i.e.
the median voter is capital-poor (relative to his/her labor endowment).
22 Thus, one may
refer to the capital income distribution as more equal, the higher the median relative
factor endowment x m.
23
Proposition 3 (Growth model): For  g g m m = ~  and  ¥ < £u 0 . A more equal capital
income distribution, i.e. a higher median relative factor endowment  x m, implies a
higher public consumption share  gm in majority voting equilibrium if  s £1 or
u r < + 1 / G. In case of a synthetic income tax (i.e. u =1), a more equal capital income
distribution unambiguously yields a higher  gm.
Proof: Directly follows from lemmas 3 and 4. ￿
7. Discussion and extensions
7.1 An alternative tax scheme
How do the results change if, alternatively, one assumes that one factor tax rate is held
constant, and the other factor tax rate varies with the public consumption share  g,
                                                          
22 According to (24), the distribution of relative factor endowments not only depends on the distribution of
capital but also on the distribution of the non-accumulated factor endowment. As Bertola (1993) suggests,
in unequal societies land ownership is highly concentrated on the politically decisive class. In this sense,
an unequal distribution of the non-accumulated factor endowment also corresponds to an unequal
distribution of the relative factor endowment. However, this would mean that an individual with a higher
non-accumulated factor endowment than the median is decisive (for a discussion of such a political bias,
see also Bénabou, 1996). As it is not the goal of this paper to discuss this case, it is useful to think about
the case of an egalitarian non-accumulated factor income distribution, i.e. l L
i = =1 for all i.
23 For instance, assume that  x
i  is log-normally distributed and let the mean of  x
i  be equal to unity. (If
l L
i = =1 for all i, this would represent a plausible real-world-distribution of relative capital). In this
case, the difference between the median and the mean of x
i  increases if and only if the Gini coefficient of
its distribution increases.24
according to (11)? First, consider the case where  . const K = t  In this case, clearly, an
increase in g (or  L t , respectively) hurts owners of capital less than owners of labor.
Thus, more equality unambiguously leads to a higher public consumption share in
voting equilibrium.
24 Second, assume that  . const L = t  If  1 = s , the initial private
consumption level  ) 0 ( i c  is not affected by an increase in  g (or  K t , respectively),
according to (23). Thus, all individuals face the same trade-off between public
consumption and growth, implying that the voting equilibrium is not affected by
inequality, i.e.  m g  is independent of  m x . (Compare the discussion of  ¥ ﬁ u , i.e.
0 = L t , in section 5.1.) If  1 < s  ( 1 > s ), an increase in g, holding  L t  constant, raises
(lowers) the private consumption level  ) 0 ( i c , according to (11) and (22). Thus, if  1 < s
( 1 > s ), more equality leads to a higher (lower) public consumption share in voting
equilibrium.
25
7.2 Inequality and growth effects of taxation
In sum, the analysis has shown that higher inequality of capital income may lead to a
smaller public sector and even a higher growth rate. This is in stark contrast to the usual
argumentation of the inequality and growth relationship through the politico-economic
channel. In this line of literature, capital-poor individuals demand higher capital taxes
which are used to finance income (or in-kind) transfers, thus depressing growth (e.g.
Bertola, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). However, this is not necessarily true if the tax
revenue is used to finance public consumption. (Recall that  ) 1 /( a a u - - = , i.e.  0 = g ,
is the special case considered in Bertola, 1993.) In my model, publicly provided goods
and services also have a strong redistributive element since individuals consume similar
amounts, although being differently taxed. Nevertheless, the voting outcome may be
considerably different to the one with direct transfers.
                                                          
24 Formally, note that  0 / ) 0 ( < ¶ ¶ L
i c t  and  0 / ) 0 ( ln
2 > ¶ ¶ ¶
i
L
i c x t , according to (22). Thus, if
m m g g ~ = , we have  0 / > ¶ ¶
m m g x  (applying the formal argumentation of section 5).
25 Formally, note that  0 , , / ) 0 ( < = > ¶ ¶ K
i c t  and  0 , , / ) 0 ( ln
2 < = > ¶ ¶ ¶
i
K
i c x t , if  1 , , > = < s , according
to (22). Thus, if 
m m g g ~ = , we have  0 , , / < = > ¶ ¶
m m g x  if  1 , , > = < s .25
7.3 Specification of preferences and the role of savings
It may be argued that the preferences assumed in the growth model are somewhat
special (i.e. preferences are homothetic with  1 =
i e ). One reason for considering these
preferences is, of course, analytical tractability (i.e. in order to obtain steady state
growth). But there are other important reasons. First, as pointed out before, the results
can be compared to literature about growth effects of public expenditure and
redistribution. Second, it allows to identify the additional savings effect, compared with
the static model of section 2. As pointed out before, in both models, higher individual
endowments affect the individually preferred public consumption share (and thus the
voting equilibrium) in two opposing ways, through a wealth effect and a substitution
effect. Distinguishing between accumulated and non-accumulated factor income in an
intertemporal context reveals an important additional mechanism. If labor income is
taxed more heavily, current private consumption unambiguously decreases. In contrast,
if the capital income tax rate rises, it may be optimal for owners of capital to adjust
savings downward in order to keep up with current private consumption levels. The
resulting growth reduction hurts owners of capital and owners of labor similarly, since
the growth rate of labor income decreases in line with capital income growth. These
properties of the model are equivalent to the fact that the savings rate is higher for
capital-rich individuals than for capital-poor ones, according to (25). In fact, it is a well-
known empirical regularity that the savings rate of households increases with individual
income (e.g. Browning and  Lusardi, 1996). Hence, the above specification of
preferences allows to work out a mechanism that may be quite relevant empirically.
7.4 Endogenous labor supply
How are the results affected if one allows for endogenous labor supply? Note that the
only heterogeneity among individuals remaining in this case are capital endowments.
Define the relative capital endowment of individual i by  z i i k K ” 0 0 / . To focus on a
simple case (analogously to subsection 5.1), let instantaneous utility now be given by
(30)  u c l G c l G i i i i ( , , ) ln ln( ) ln = + - + b g 1 ,  0 , > g b ,26
where individual time endowments are identical and normalized to unity such that
leisure of individual i is given by  ( ) 1-li . Analogously to (26), life-time utility V i  can
be obtained by
(31) r b g
g J
r
V c l G
i i i = + - + +
+





For simplicity, the discussion focuses on an equilibrium in which all individuals choose
positive labor supply (i.e.  0 >
i l  for all  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i ).
26 As shown in appendix B, the



























where aggregate labor supply  L L L = ~( ) t  is a strictly decreasing function of the labor
income tax rate  tL  and  1 ) 1 ( - + < b L . Note that due to the savings effect discussed
above, the capital income tax rate  tK  does not affect  ci( ) 0  under specification (30).
Moreover,  0 / ) 0 ( ln < L
i c t ¶ ¶  and  0 / ) 0 ( ln 2 > i
L
i c ¶z t ¶ ¶ . Thus, the negative impact
of an increase in the public consumption share  g  on ci( ) 0  is again less pronounced for
capital-rich individuals than for capital-rich ones if tL > 0 (i.e. if  ¥ < < - - u a a ) 1 /( ).
How does individual labor supply adjust to taxation, conditional on the relative capital
endowment z i ? As also shown in appendix B, individual labor supply  li  can now be
written as a function  ~ ( , ) l i
L
i t z  with  ¶ ¶t ~ / l i
L < 0,  ¶ ¶z ~ / l i i < 0 and
¶ ¶t ¶z 2 0 ~ / l i
L
i < . Thus, the negative impact of labor income taxation on individual
                                                          
26 A more detailed analysis is provided in appendix B, where it is shown that capital-rich individuals may
not work in equilibrium. It can be shown that typically also in this case the individually preferred public
consumption share 
i g  is monotonic (i.e. non-decreasing) in 
i z  if an equilibrium exists. However, an
equilibrium may fail to exist for some parameter constellations.
27 Initial public consumption and the equilibrium growth rate  J r = - r  are given by
G gaK L L ( ) ~( ) 0 0 = t
a  and J t a t r
a = - - - ( )( ) ~( ) 1 1 K L aL , respectively.27
labor supply becomes stronger, the higher the relative capital endowment z i . (Note that
this is analogous to the savings effect, i.e. remember  0 / ) 0 ( 0
2 < ¶ ¶ ¶
i
K
i k k t & .) Due to
this labor supply effect, the elasticity of leisure  )
~
1 ( i l -  with respect to  tL  (or  g ,
respectively, if  tL > 0) turns out to higher for capital-rich agents (i.e. as shown in
appendix B,  0 / )
~
1 ( ln 2 > - i
L
i l z ¶ t ¶ ¶ ).
Again, analogous to the discussion in the preceding subsection, it should be noted that
this result is an implication of the specification of preferences. However, it may not be
implausible to view capital-richer individuals to be better able to adjust labor supply
downward if labor income taxation increases.
8. Conclusion
According to a standard argument, higher income inequality fosters  redistributive
activities of the government in favor of the median income earner. This paper has
examined the relationship between income inequality and the public consumption share
in both a static and a dynamic median voter model, where public consumption is
financed by income taxes. In the static case, a higher relative income of the median
voter has been assumed to imply a higher individual tax share for financing public
consumption. Nevertheless, the substitution effect of this higher relative price for
publicly provided goods and services on the individual demand for public consumption
may be dominated by a wealth effect. Thus, although public expenditure plays a
redistributive role in the model, higher income inequality may nevertheless imply a
smaller size of the government in majority voting equilibrium.
More interestingly, it was shown in a general equilibrium growth model, that this result
may even be strengthened due to the role of taxation for savings and growth. A dynamic
model allows to distinguish taxation effects of accumulated and non-accumulated
factors of production. For instance, it has been shown that in the case where public
consumption expenditure is financed by a synthetic proportional income tax and labor
supply is exogenous, a capital-rich median voter unambiguously prefers a bigger
government as provider of goods and services than a capital-poor median voter. The28
reason for this is the following. Higher capital income taxation reduces savings, leaving
its impact on (current) private consumption levels of owners of capital ambiguous. In
contrast, owners of labor unambiguously reduce their private consumption levels in
response to labor income taxation. However, the reduced savings of owners of capital
slow down investment-driven growth of both capital and labor income. Thus, under a
synthetic proportional income tax, savings adjustments leave capital-poor individuals to
bear more of the tax burden if the public consumption share is raised. Allowing for
endogenous labor supply additionally shifts the relative tax burden towards capital-poor
agents, if capital-rich agents are also more able to cope with labor income taxation by
reducing labor supply.
In fact, empirically, more equal economies do not seem to have smaller governments
and thus do not seem to be less engaged in redistribution towards the median voter
through the tax-system.
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Appendix
A. Proof of lemmas 1-4
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where  ) (￿ ¢ s  and  MRS¢ ￿ ( ) denote first derivatives. Note that the inverse of the elasticity
of substitution between the two goods can be written as
( ) ( / )
( ) /
ei i i
i i i i
i MRS c G
y s G G
s
- = ¢
- 1  with  s MRS c G i i i = ( / ), according to (4).
(Also note that  c y s G i i i i = - ). Thus, we have  ( ) ) ( ) / ( ) ( 1 ￿ ¢ = ￿ ¢ + S MR s y S MR G i i i i e .



















thus confirming lemma 1. ￿
Proof of lemma 2:  The current-value  Hamiltonian function  ` for the utility
maximization problem of individual i, given his/her initial capital endowment ki
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(A.5) -
`
= - ￿ - = -
¶
¶
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i i i & $30
and the transversality condition  lim
tﬁ￿
- = e k t
rt i( ) 0 (where the latter holds if  r > J ) are
necessary and sufficient for a maximum because of the concavity of  ` and positive
discounting (i.e. r > 0). Differentiating (A.4) with respect to time yields
(A.6) - = - - $ $ ( ) $ l s s g i i c G 1 .
Combining (A.5) and (A.6) and using the expression for r given in (8) yields equation
(20). ￿
Proof of lemma 3: Neglecting the restrictions on  g , the preferred spending fraction  i g ~
is given by  0 / = g V i ¶ ¶ . Thus, confirming  0 / 2 2 < g V i ¶ ¶  and applying the implicit
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according to (27). Thus,  i g ~  is increasing in  i x  if  0 ‡ L t  and  ¥ < F < 0 , i.e. if
¥ < < - - u a a ) 1 /( . Moreover,  i g ~  is decreasing in  i x  if  0 ‡ K t  and  0 < F , i.e. if
) 1 /( a a u - - < . Finally, note that according to (27),  ¶ ¶ V g i / = 0 does not depend on
i x  if  0 = L t , i.e. if  ¥ ﬁ u  and thus  ¥ ﬁ F . This concludes the proof. ￿
Proof of lemma 4:  Note that  i g ~  increases (remains constant, decreases) with  xi if
0 ) , ( ) 0 ( ln 2 < = > i i g c x ¶ ¶ ¶ . Substituting (12) and (13) into (22) yields
(A.8) c
g
k g aK l i i i ( )
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Use (A.9) to confirm
(A.10)
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(i) First, consider s >1 which implies  G > 0. (Remember  G = - + - ( )( )( ) s g a 1 1 1 a.)
Thus, the right hand side of (A.10) is positive (zero, negative) if u r < = > + ( , ) / 1 G .
(ii) Second, note that  r a K = - - > ( ) ( ) 1 1 a t J  implies  r t > - - G( ) 1 K , according to
(21). (Remember  g g s - + = W ) 1 ( .) Also note that  1 0 £ < L t  implies u t t t = ‡ K L K / .
Since s <1 implies G < 0,  r t > - - G( ) 1 K  implies  r u > - - G( ) 1 . This concludes the
proof. ￿
B. Endogenous labor supply
The analysis of the corresponding optimal control problem is analogous to the proof of
lemma 2. Using specification (30) and neglecting the restriction  ] 1 , 0 [ ˛ i l  for a moment,
the first-order conditions with respect to the control variables  ci  and  li  imply
w c l i i / 1 b - = . (This simply reflects the standard condition that the marginal rate of
substitution between private consumption and leisure equals the wage rate.) In balanced











Thus,  & ( ) &( ) l t L t i = = 0 for all i and t. (Note that (A.5) remains valid.) With endogenous
labor supply, (8) and (9) have to be replaced by32
(B.2) r aL K = - - ( )( ) 1 1 t a a
and
(B.3) w t aK t L L ( ) ( ) ( ) = - - 1 1 t a a ,
respectively. Analogously to (23), one finds
(B.4) c k w l i i i ( ) ( ) 0 0 0 = + r .
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.
As (B.5) reveals, capital-rich individuals may choose  0 =
i l . Moreover, an equilibrium
may fail to exist for some parameter constellations, which is ruled out here by
assumption.
To save space, like in the main text the exclusive focus is on the case  0 >
i l  for all i.








0 ￿ = , (B.5)
implies that aggregate equilibrium labor supply  L is implicitly given by
(B.6) L
L a L





a + - =
-
- ,
i.e.  1 ) 1 ( - + < b L . Suppressing all unessential parameters, write  L L L = ~( ) t  and note
that (B.6) implies  dL d L
~ / t < 0 by the implicit function theorem. Individual labor
supply is then given by33
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according to (B.5) and (B.6). Hence,  0 /
~
< ¶ L
i l t ¶ ,  0 /
~
< ¶ i i l z ¶  and
0 /
~ 2 < i
L
i l z ¶ t ¶ ¶ . To derive  ) 0 ( i c , use (B.3), (B.4), (B.6) and (B.7), which gives





























This confirms all claims made in subsection 7.4.
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